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When, if ever, are clinical sociologists justified in accepting the directives
of employers and management sponsors as setting the parameters within
which they proceed with their work? In particular, is it ever permissible for
clinical sociologists to accept an employer's or a manager-sponsor's definition
of a problem to be studied, even though they may not view it as the more fundamental problem needing study in the situation? These questions are important for understanding the professional role and moral responsibilities of practitioners in the still-coalescing profession of clinical sociology. They also have
increasing practical importance at a time when job opportunities for
sociologists are shifting from academia to industry and government-both
within organizations as employees and as external organizational consultants.
My aim is not to attempt a direct response to the questions in the form of
providing a set of simple guidelines. Instead, it is the more modest one of arguing against two influential answers to them. Several prominent writers have
held that to the extent sociologists study what employers or manager-sponsors
tell them to study, they are either (1) not doing clinical sociology at all, or (2)
abdicating a large share of their professional responsibilities. I want to
challenge these views in, respectively, Part I and II of this essay, and in doing
so comment on the legitimate interplay between the organizational authority
of management and the professional responsibility of clinical sociologists.
I.

In his insightful and influential essay, "Explorations in Applied Science,"
Alvin Gouldner (1965) tacitly held that to the degree sociologists follow a
client's definition of a problem to be studied, they are not doing clinical
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sociology. Gouldner formulated two models for applied sociology: the clinical
and the engineering. He cites as an approximate illustration of the clinical type
a study at Hacienda Vicos, an Indian community in Peru. The social scientists
discovered that much of the strife among various groups of the Indians was
due to fights over the ownership of cattle. They suggested a simple program of
branding. This idea was immediately verbally agreed to, but it was implemented only after the scientists provided branding irons and initiated further discussions with leaders of the groups. The branding system successfully
ended the disputes over the ownership of cattle.
Gouldner's example of the contrasting engineering approach is the
familiar case of an industrial firm which hires a consulting social scientist to
assess employees' satisfaction with their work. The scientist conducts a survey
of employee attitudes and conveys statistical information in a report to the
management of the industrial firm. The report usually includes "some recommendations for changes in the company's labor relations policies" (p.l 1). At
management's discretion, the sociologist may discuss the report with management before it "may be quietly interred in that graveyard of creativity, the filing room" (p. 11). The attitude survey usually throws little light on any
underlying problems which probably were vaguely sensed by management and
had led them to request the survey in the first place-problems such as weakened
informal communication channels between management and workers.
Moreover, the report may be used by management during union negotiations
in a way that heightens labor-management tensions.
On the basis of these two examples, Gouldner itemizes a number of differences between the clinical and engineering approaches within sociology and
other applied social sciences.
1. The "consulting 'engineer' has conceived and completed his assignment largely in terms formulated by his client" (p. 11), and hence merely
studied what he was told to study (p. 13). Clinicians, by contrast, study the problem that they identify by their independent judgment. And they attempt to
arrange the "relationship with a client so as to secure the latter's consent to examine (i.e., diagnose and treat) the underlying problems" of the group (p. 19).
2. Engineers present their results and proposed solutions to just their
client-sponsor, typically management. Clinicians present their results to all
groups involved in the study (p. 14).
3. Engineers view themselves as mere bearers of facts and figures, which
are generally best conveyed in writing (pp. 17-18). Clinicians emphasize the
personal interactions necessary for helping the client to genuinely "learn
something" (p.20).
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4. Engineers presuppose their client's values as given and settled, and
affirm a strictly value-neutral approach. Clinicians establish a relationship
where the client's values "may legitimately come up for re-examination in the
light of their connection with the client's problems" (p. 14).
5. Engineers naively assume that their clients will accept as true
whatever is discovered through proper scientific investigation. Clinicians expect resistance from the clients and come prepared to deal with it (p. 19).
My interest here is with (1), which is logically distinct from the other
features. It sets up the valuable guideline that sociologists seek to obtain client
consent to get at the fundamental problems. But it also goes beyond this in implying that to the extent sociologists work on problems as identified and
assigned by their mangement-client or employer they are not doing clinical
sociology. This seems to me an inadequate way of conceptualizing what constitutes clinical work in organizational development.
To begin with, Gouldner's descriptions of the examples involve both
under-description and slanting in ways that are relevant to the issue at hand.
Missing from the industrial consulting case is a specification of the recommendations made by the consultant concerning ways to improve the company's
labor relations policies. Suppose that the recommendations were based upon
or embodied insights that the consultant had gained while conducting the
study and while exercising a significant degree of helpful diagnosis of the
workers' attitudes. Suppose further that if the recommendations were acted
upon by management they would lead to marked improvement in the job
satisfaction of the employees, greater openness and trust among employees,
lessened anxiety, or healthier attitudes. In that case I would see no reason for
refusing to view the sociologist's work as "clinical" in nature.
The description of the consultant case is slanted because of the virtual
assumption of an absence of genuine good will in the management. Management is portrayed as likely not to act on the (unspecified) recommendations, to
use them primarily in power struggles with unions, or to use the survey to
maintain a status quo in strained relations among employees and management. By contrast, in the Peruvian Indian case the clients happen to be responsive to the sociologists' suggestions. Surely, by chance, the opposite could have
occurred, or both cases could have involved therapeutic successes. This would
make it much less natural to refuse to call the consultant's efforts clinical.
I personally have no hesitation is viewing consultants as doing clinical
sociology where they seek to aid managers whom they perceive as having the
good will to improve the working environment of the organization. The
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sociologists may, of course, do such clinical work stupidly, badly, or merely in
a limited way, depending in part on the presence of various other features
mentioned in 2-5 above. Gouldner assumed, no doubt justifiably, that the
sociologist's approach in the Peruvian Indian case is more likely to have
positive results than those of the consultant. But it is misleading and questionbegging to pack an assumption about the relative likelihood of success into the
portrayal of the approaches. And it seems inappropriate to make the criterion
for whether sociologists have engaged in clinical work the managements' use
or misuse of the sociologists' results.
The criticisms raised so far are based upon the central meaning of the
word "clinical," which extends to efforts to improve health and well-being that
may go beyond acting always on one's independent diagnosis of a problem.
The point of the criticisms was to show that Gouldner's distinction between the
two approaches does not turn on health-centered vs. non-health centered
sociology. Both types of sociologists may well be dedicated to improving
healthy group relationships, and have some success therein. Their main differences reside elsewhere, in the degree of autonomy and scope of independent
activities of the two.
We would perhaps have a better image of Gouldner's distinction if he had
allowed some of both types of sociology to be called clinical where the focus is
on therapy (in some general sense), and instead labeled the two types of
sociologists "physicians" vs. "nurses." For his real interest, as is made explicit
in the final sentence of his essay, is in the type of clinical sociology "which can
aid in mending the rift between the policy maker and the social scientist"
(p.21). The clinician he heralds must have the degree of authority and independence of the physician, not the nurse. Yet the complexity of possible interplays between the responsibilities of organizational administrators and the
therapeutic interventions of sociologists would seem to welcome a greater
variety of roles for clinical sociologists.
My view, then, is that accepting a sponsor's definition of a problem to be
studied and working within general directions for goals of a study do not by
themselves make applied sociology non-clinical. For there may still be room
left for valuable diagnosis and recommendations by a sociologist seeking to
make genuinely therapeutic improvements. Such restrictions do, of course,
place limitations on the degree of autonomous work of the sociologist. But
limited therapy, to continue with the medical language, is therapy nevertheless. In any case, consulting work will virtually always involve some degree
of accepting the client-sponsor's view of the problem to be studied since it is
the sponsor who initiates and sustains the services of the consultant toward an
end the sponsor views as valuable to the organization. Perhaps for this reason
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at least one writer has recently made the extreme recommendation to carry
Gouldner's insistence on wide autonomy to its logical conclusion by
distinguishing clinical sociology from all consulting and bureaucratic roles
(Straus, 1979: 22-4).
In their textbook, Clinical Sociology, Glassner and Freedman cite with
approval Gouldner's account of the consultant and use his 'engineering' model
as a major contrast with the clinical approach. They suggest that "from a
clinical viewpoint, the engineering procedure ... is analogous to a physician
limiting his or her treatment of a broken limb to writing a prescription for pain
killers" (Glassner, 1979: 13). This, however, is a misleading analogy. The reality
of the situation is generally not that sociologists absurdly refrain at whim from
applying the full range of their skills. They are often, especially in doing
organizational development, given guidelines by their sponsors.
A more relevant analogy is with the patient who places restrictions on the
physician and nurse. Thus, after weighing the side-effects of various optional
therapies, a cancer patient might refuse to allow an M.D. to attempt to remove
the cancer-the underlying problem-and instead request treatment for pain
during the terminal stage of the illness. When a Jehovah Witness refuses treatment by blood-transfusions, and hence refuses to see the basic problem as the
need for a blood transfusion, doctors' options are restricted. But the limited
care they provide instead still qualifies as reasonable medical work.
To be sure, even these analogies are limited, Sociologists deal with
groups, not just individual patients. Moreover, in organizational consulting
they are confronted with both a client who sponsors the work and another
client who is the target directly influenced by the work. A slightly closer,
though still misleading, analogy would be with an M.D. treating a child or
adult in the custody of parent or guardian who contacts the doctor. The guardian stands in a position of authority, akin to that of the employer or
manager. In these cases that authority is subject to abuse and has limits, both
moral and legal. But within bounds it is permissible for an M.D. or sociologist
to accept guidelines of the parent or manager.

II.
The discussion thus far has focused on two emphases in delineating the
role of clinic sociologists: (a) according to the degree of independence the applied sociologists have in identifying the problems they will study; and (b) according to the sorts of therapeutic aims and approaches used and attempted.
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The current emphasis in the literature seems to be upon (a). I have favored the
wider definition obtained by emphasizing (b). It is time to turn to the significant issue of whether applied sociologists are acting irresponsibly when the
degree of their autonomy fits Gouldner's engineering model.
Neither Gouldner nor Glassner and Freedman explicitly say that
'engineering' sociologists are acting irresponsibly. But others have suggested
this. Donald Warwick (1978: 149), one of the most insightful contemporary
writers in the ethics of social science, held that when organizational development practitioners simply go along with management's definition of a problem
they are acting irresponsibly in reducing themselves to the status of technicians. Warwick makes this charge in response to a case of organizational
development described by Beckhard (1969: 45-6) which bears retelling.
Due to increased competition and costs, an outmoded marketing strategy
and a somewhat rigid management style, a large food and catering company
had over several years lost its leadership in the market. One of the managers
diagnosed the problem as calling for a change away from the current familymanagement of the company to a professional management which would introduce innovative marketing strategies as well as new organization and promotion patterns for employees. After convincing other members of the
management to adopt this major change, he contracted social scientists as consultants to help with implementing the change. The consultants, after examining the situation, basically accepted and worked within the aims set by
management. They did so even though they soon learned that most employees
were largely satisfied with the current family-managed arrangement and
would find the change threatening and even traumatic. The complex and extensive role of the consultant centered on fostering the attitudinal and emotional adjustments among employees necessary for effecting the change with
the least harm to individuals. Detailed plans were formulated, surveys conducted, and numerous and varied meetings held with individuals and groups
over several moths. These included team-development meetings, confrontations groups, off-site conferences, and individual counseling.
Warwick (1978: 149) raises two ethical objections to the role of the consultants in this case. First, he emphasizes that the ability to define the problem
to be studied carries with it a large power advantage, and he hints that it may
be unfair for management to have this increase in the power they already marshal. Second, he asserts that when consultants, as in this case, simply go along
with the definition of the problem specified by the sponsor they have irresponsibly reduced themselves to the status of "a technician applying the tools of
social science to ends specified by others." Such a role definition "implies
significant abdication of professional responsibility."
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Missing in these charges is a sympathetic account of the legitimate areas
of responsibility of management. Managers have the authority and power they
do because of their charge to responsibly insure the effective functioning of the
organization they serve, an organization directed toward goals selected in large
measure by owners and stockholders. Moreover, surely in some areas
managers possess not only the authority but the special expertise for directing
the organization. Management had every right to decide to shift the organization in the direction they did. I personally cannot fault the consultants for accepting that decision in the case at hand and seeking to engage in clinical work
within the general limits set by it.
Warwick's discussion is focused on external consultants, yet his remarks
are phrased generally so as to apply to all organizational development practitioners. Now, the internal practitioners of clinical sociology-ones who are
employees within organizations-would be in a hopeless position if they were
viewed as irresponsible for going along with management's directions. They
have special responsibilities for serving the organization, within moral limits,
as directed by management. And at least in many cases those moral limits do
not prohibit going along with management's definition of the problem to be
studied.
At this point I wish to add several caveats to what I have said, while expressing my large areas of agreement with Warwick. First, I have urged that
clinical sociologists are not automatically acting irresponsibly when they go
along with management's definition of a problem and do not pursue the problem they have independently diagnosed. This, of course, does not mean they
are always responsible when they do so. If management's decisions are
unethical or violate the sociologists' personal standards of minimal decency
the sociologist has a compelling reason for refusing to participate.
Second, the proper exercise of conscience in this area presupposes that
sociologists always exercise independent judgment in the sense of making an
assessment of the management's decisions and, where appropriate, expressing
their viewpoints. Here I wholly concur with Gouldner, Glassner and Freedman, and Warwick's sharp objection to blind, thoughtless, and unquestioning
obedience. All I have argued against above is the idea that they must always
work primarily on the basis of that independent assessment. The objection to
blind obedience holds for sociologists working within corporate settings where
they may have relatively the same degree of control over the corporate goals as
do most engineers. For engineers, in spite of Gouldner's slightly negative use
of the word, have similar responsibilities to form and express their views, or so
I have argued elsewhere (Martin, 1980).
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Third, clinical sociologists must make every effort to define their specific
role with respect to each concrete situation of organizational development or
social intervention and make that definition clear to all involved. I have suggested that they are not automatically irresponsible when they accept management's definition of a problem to guide their work. They would, however, be
irresponsible if they simultaneously encouraged or even allowed their clienttargets to perceive them as doing something else-e.g., as acting on their own
independent assessment of the situation with an attempt to give all groups a
fair and equal hearing alongside that of management as to which problem to
pursue.
Fourth, there is a continuum of possible degrees of autonomy of
sociological work within organizations. At some point, where there is a virtually complete loss of freedom to diagnose problems and make recommendations, clinical work will become impossible. It is the responsibility of
sociologists to seek to secure for their work the necessary degree of autonomy
to make a genuine contribution, without always insisting on the full degree of
autonomy urged by the writers I have discussed.
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